US court rules on royalty for 2G, 3G, 4G SEPs

The court took a firm stand against royalty stacking. The judgement cited one of the key reasons for using top down analysis is that it prevents royalty stacking. The court also found that the results from the ex-standard approach proposed by Ericsson are highly suggestive of royalty stacking and lack fundamental credibility. The court adopted a maximum aggregate royalty rate based on various public announcements made by SEP owners and industry leaders for the top down calculations.
The court relied on the top down approach for determining a fair and reasonable royalty rate. It said: “A top down model aims to value a portfolio of SEPs by determining a fair and reasonable total aggregate royalty for all patents that are essential to a standard.” “It then apportions that royalty to the SEP owners based on the relative value of their portfolio against the value of all patents essential to the standard.”
Rates under FRAND:
4G- 0.45%
3G- 0.30%
2G-0.16%
(source: IP Pro Patents)

FRAND rates in US Judgement

A US judge has handed down a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licence for standard-essential patents (SEPs) in a high-profile quarrel between telecoms company Ericsson and TCL, a China-based smartphone maker.   Royalty rates fixed as under:

A running royalty for End User Terminals Sold beginning January 1, 2018 according to the following schedule:

 For each such product Sold that is compliant with GSM, GPRS, or EDGE (but not compliant with WCDMA, HSPA, and/or 4G), 0.164% of the Net Selling Price if sold in the United States, 0.118% of the Net Selling Price if sold in Europe, and 0.090% of the Net Selling Price if sold anywhere in the world other than the United States or Europe; 

 For each such product Sold that is compliant with WCDMA or HSPA (but not compliant with 4G), 0.300% of the Net Selling Price if sold in the United States, 0.264% of the Net Selling Price if sold in Europe, and 0.224% of the Net Selling Price if sold anywhere in the world other than the United States or Europe;

 For each such product Sold that is compliant with 4G, 0.450% of the Net Selling Price if sold in the United States, and 0.314% of the Net Selling Price if sold anywhere in the world other than the United States. Should TCL purchase TCL End User Terminals from a Third Party claiming to  be licensed or to have pass-through rights under Ericsson Licensed Patents that confer a license covering the End User Terminal, then TCL will receive credit for that pass through license in the royalty rates applied. In particular, with regard to Ericsson Patents that are essential to the WCDMA Standards (“Ericsson WCDMA Licensed Patents”) for the Selling of ASICs, then TCL may have the option of remaining unlicensed by Ericsson under such Ericsson WCDMA Licensed Patents subject to Selling TCL End User Terminals with ASICs that are compliant with the WCDMA Standard. TCL shall then pay a royalty equal to the rate paid for the GSM/GPRS/EDGE and/or LTE Standards as specified in Clause E(3)(a) or Clause E(3)(c) of this Injunction, as applicable, for each such TCL End User Terminal  provided that such TCL End User Terminal is also compliant with any of the GSM/GPRS/EDGE Standards and/or LTE Standards while it is qualified as a WCDMA End User Terminal. For the avoidance of doubt, the Parties acknowledge the doctrine of patent exhaustion. Ericsson confirms that upon the Effective Date it has not provided any licenses with pass-through rights under its 4G patent portfolio to a chipset provider, making, using, importing, selling, or otherwise disposing of 4G compliant chipsets and components. For the avoidance of doubt, TCL shall only be required to pay the highest  prevailing royalty rate under this Injunction for each End User Terminal. For example, the 3G royalty rate for 3G multimode End User Terminal includes the royalty rate also for the 2G part in such End User Terminal.

Source: Judgement

IEEE amends it Patent (FRAND) Policy endorsing royalty payment on chip and not on the product.

Readers are familiar with court cases concerning royalty payments on essential patents for standards. Licensors like Qualcomm, Ericsson demand royalty of final product (mobile phone) whereas Indian Licensee feel royalty should be on the chip and not on the mobile or other form of finished products incorporating the chip. On February 8th the standard setting organisation IEEE voted to change patent policy and these changes largely relate to the commitment of IEEE members to license patents to users of IEEE standards on terms that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). 
The contentious part says:

“Reasonable Rate” shall mean appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard. In addition, determination of such Reasonable Rates should include, but need not be limited to, the consideration of:

• The value that the functionality of the claimed invention or inventive feature within the Essential Patent Claim contributes to the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices the Essential Patent Claim.
• The value that the Essential Patent Claim contributes to the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices that claim, in light of the value contributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that Compliant Implementation.
• Existing licenses covering use of the Essential Patent Claim, where such licenses were not obtained under the explicit or implicit threat of a Prohibitive Order, and where the circumstances and resulting licenses are otherwise sufficiently comparable to the circumstances of the contemplated license.

The vigorous pubic debate over the IEEE amendments highlights a rift in the standardization world between Patent Centric and Product Centric firms.  The business models that these firms have adopted are different, yet they have co-existed for decades.  Some have predicted that important contributors will leave IEEE as a result of the recent amendments. 

Qualcomm argument; 

Defining a “reasonable” royalty using controversial and unworkable valuation methodologies—including tying a royalty rate to the “smallest saleable component” of a standard-compliant device—all of which are intended to minimize licensing fees for SEPs.

Indian perspective

 IEEE endorsed a calculation based on the value of the chip inside the device, even if many other aspects of the device benefit from or use the contributed technology. This benefits local assembly of mobile phones and most other network based products and can enable Make-In-India.